THE GLOBAL JIHADIST MOVEMENT: A DEADLIER FORM OF TERRORISM?

by

Matthew T. Suppenbach

An Abstract
of a thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in the Department of Criminal Justice University of Central Missouri

May, 2016
Counterterrorism is priority for security professionals in the contemporary global security environment. Key government leaders assert that the global jihadist movement is a serious manifestation of global terrorism and that without robust and consistent counterterrorist operations, it is likely that the movement will expand in operational capacity and influence. This study uses a sample of events from 1994-2014, generated from the Global Terrorism Database and assigned affiliation with or without the global jihadist movement based off of group designation. As a whole, terror incidents follow similar arcs in attack, target, and weapon typologies. Furthermore, a majority of terror incidents in the date range are unaffiliated with the global jihadist movement, yet more individuals were killed and wounded by incidents affiliated with the movement.
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WARRENSBURG, MISSOURI
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my wife, Jillian, for her constant support at home throughout my graduate studies, without which this experience would have been extraordinarily more difficult. I would also like to thank my mentor and academic advisor, Dr. Jennifer Varriale Carson, who was present without fail. I would also like to thank the members of my thesis committee for their participation in this project, and the faculty of the Criminal Justice department at UCM for facilitating and guiding my graduate study.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Executive heads of state and government officials alike have established a unified discourse that terrorism, defined as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation,” is an existential threat to open and free democratic societies (Cameron, 2015; Hollande, 2015; Merkel, 2015; Obama, 2015; Obama, 2016a-b; LaFree & Dugan, 2007, p. 184). For example, President Obama recently stated that his “top priority is to defeat ISIL and to eliminate the scourge of this barbaric terrorism [...] around the world” (2016, para. 52). The President also noted an intensification of the counterterrorism effort was required (Obama, 2015; Gardiner & Shear, 2015). Similarly, Prime Minister David Cameron declared that, “The terrorist aim is clear. It is to divide us and to destroy our way of life” (2015, para. 15). Experts in the U.S. security services contend that the global jihadist movement occupies a role of central significance in this threat (Comey, 2014; Scott, 2015; Flynn, 2014; Johnson, 2014a-b; Hunter & Heinke, 2011). In fact, and in his recent Worldwide Threat Assessment to Congress, Director Clapper identifies and discusses only groups affiliated with the global jihad, such as the Islamic State and al Qa’ida, under his remarks regarding terrorism (Clapper, 2016).

Despite steady discussion of the threat of this phenomenon, there is a lack of consistency in the terminology utilized. For example, “radical Islamic terrorism” is used frequently in the literature (LaFree & Dugan, 2015; Barros & Proenca, 2005; Warwick, 2014), while some researchers prefer the term “Islamist terrorism” (Pantucci, 2011; Mousseau, 2011), and still others turn to the expression “global jihad” (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2014; Carson, 2016; Braniff & Moghadam, 2011; Byman, 2015; Rabasa et al., 2006). Though this wording adequately describes the phenomenon, the previous two phrases (radical Islamic terrorism;
Islamist terrorism) are inferior to that of “global jihadist movement” (GJM). Even among these favored phrases for the movement, descriptions of the phenomenon are inextricably linked to many political sensitivities (Schubel, 2015; McWhorter, 2015). Thus, it has become widely accepted to stack adjectives in order to properly address a certain type of terrorism without being unduly offensive. “Violent,” “radical,” “Islamic,” “extremist,” and “terrorist” are all words, in multiple variations, used to identify the movement. These phrases, in their many expressions, are left unfavorable due to their overly cumbersome nature of qualification and negative political effect. Contrarily, “Islamist,” “Islamism,” and “Islamist terrorism” are words used to identify the exact same phenomenon. In particular, Islamism is a term used within Political Science and Islamic Studies and is roughly an equivocation to other political schemas such as “fascism or nationalism” (Pipes, 1998). Even so, this characterization of the phenomenon is unfavorable due to a perception of oversimplification or generalization of a mainstream religion.

Ultimately, this study prefers the language “global jihadist movement” for two reasons. First, this phrasing is representative of the extent and geographic trend of the movement in becoming increasingly disperse. Second, the word ‘jihad’ connotes the religious affinity and goal of the movement, which is to establish a supranational Caliphate or, the “central institution of sovereignty in Islam” (Lewis, 1996, p. 54). Lastly, GJM has been operationalized through the conceptual framework of McCauley and Moskalenko’s (2014, p. 70) study. These authors outline the movement’s narrative frame through the following criteria:

1. Islam is under attack by Western crusaders led by the United States

2. Jihadis, whom the West refers to as 'terrorists,' are defending against this attack

3. The actions they take in defense of Islam are proportional, just, and religiously sanctified and therefore,

4. It is the duty of good Muslims to support these actions.
Despite the spirited discussion regarding terminology, along with the aforementioned agreement from world leaders and security experts that the GJM as a major terrorist threat, the extant literature lacks clear and systematic quantification of the movement (Young & Findley, 2011; Freilich & LaFree, 2016). This is not surprising given the deficit of quantitative data in terrorism research as a whole, which is “not as dominant” as qualitative research (Schmid, 2011, p. 11). In fact, Lum, Kennedy, and Sherley (2006) find that empirical research, based on quantitative data, is the exception in terrorism research with only “3% of peer-reviewed articles using empirical analysis” (p. 8). “The overwhelming majority of research, they find, are “thought pieces” (Lum, Kennedy, & Sherley, 2008, p. 8).

The empirical research on the GJM movement that does exist has been more limited and fails to address the larger question; namely, what is the scope of the GJM? Previous work has focused on evaluating policies, such as the use of targeted killings (Hepworth, 2014; Wilner, 2010), or explains complex insurgency-counterinsurgency relationships (Condra and Shapiro, 2012; Fielding and Shortland, 2010). However, these studies are often centered on one country (Linke, Witmer, O’Loughlin, 2012), one group (Forest, 2012; Stenersen, 2010), and/or one time period (Haddad, 2004). Other work fails to examine terrorism as the primary outcome (Mousseau, 2011; Torres, Jordán, & Horsburgh, 2006). Two recent exceptions in the literature that assess the GJM’s broader impact, albeit with related limitations, are that of the work of LaFree and Dugan (2015) and Barros and Proenca (2005). LaFree and Dugan (2015) identify the 20 deadliest terror groups globally from 2002-2013 using the Global Terrorism Database. Barros and Proenca (2005) analyzed characteristics associated with Islamic terrorist attacks from 1979-2002 using the ITERATE data. LaFree and Dugan (2015) found that the lethality of terrorist attacks has increased since 2001 and the deadliest groups are “radical Islamic.” Barros and
Proenca (2005) found that Europe, the U.S., and Canada will face similar levels of terrorist targeting and counterterrorism missions must remain robust in effort.

Building upon this important research, the current study aims to systematically operationalize the GJM and present basic trends and patterns of the movement over the last twenty years. The first section serves as a review of the extant literature in order to establish the contextual extent and definition of the global jihadist movement by identifying its history, ideology, key groups, and key shifts in the movement today. After which, this study is able to review the two related quantitative studies in the literature. The next chapter gives an overview of the sample systematically and thoughtfully collected from the Global Terrorism Database, along with the current study’s methodology. Lastly, this thesis ends with a description of key findings and implications of those findings. Overall, significant differences were found in operational trends and metrics between incidents affiliated with the movement and those unaffiliated when considering casualties, property damage, and the use of suicide attacks.
A Modern History of the Global Jihadist Movement

The modern source for what can be identified as the “jihad,” a physical struggle or “holy war” against the unbeliever, can be found in the 1980s (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004, p. 55). Islamic scholars, however, define jihad as the “energy [one] must expend while striving for a high purpose or noble ideal” (Sharif, 2015, p. 1). When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in late 1979, those who felt “called” engaged in a jihad in order to fight against and expel the “invaders” (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004, p. 55; ODNI, 2006, p. 11). These fighters are referred to as the mujahideen, which translates to English as “one who engages in jihad” (Etheredge, 2009).

The Afghan-Soviet war rallied all who believed in resisting a “godless” state oppressor. Usama bin Laden leveraged his wealth and business resources to create a network of support for the Afghan mujahideen (Borum & Gelles, 2005, p. 469). The conflict brought together bin Laden, Abdullah Azzam, and Ayman al Zawahiri through operation of the Services Bureau (known as Mektab al Khidmat) (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004, p. 56; Borum & Gelles, 2005). The outcome of the Afghan-Soviet war favored the jihadists, but the key result of the conflict was the development of relationships for bin Laden through the Services Bureau that would last for decades. Although al Qaeda’s leadership of the jihad had not yet occurred, bin Laden was engaged in financial and military support, rapidly building infrastructure that would later become useful (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004, pp. 54-59). In 1992, bin Laden issued a fatwa, a religious declaration or legal opinion, directing all Muslims to repel any outside influencing nations from all Islamic lands (Sayen, 2003, p. 954; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004, p. 59).
By 1998, bin Laden appeared to be the leader of the World Islamic Front: an organization that articulated the movement’s mission and ideas. The importance of al Qa’ida to the movement cannot be understated. The FBI, an organization that takes special interest in financial crimes, framed the GJM around a base of support from al Qa’ida, indicating the group was strategically leading the movement (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004, p. 186). Supporting the notion of al Qa’ida’s leadership position, it was extremely important to bin Laden to consistently guard the organization’s image, believing that media propaganda was one of the more effective tools in their jihad (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004, p. 191). Ultimately, given the acceptance and promulgation of bin Laden’s ideology, articulated in his fatwas, al Qa’ida was of singular importance in the expansion of the global jihadist movement (bin Laden, 1996a; bin Laden, 1996b; bin Laden, 1998; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004, pp. 55-59, 67, 71, 145-150).

### Ideology and Inspiration of the Movement

The writings of certain Islamic scholars led to the formation of Usama bin Laden’s understanding of Islam, and in particular, the role of jihad in a believer’s life. The trigger for bin Laden occurred when U.S. troops were prepositioned in 1990 during Operation Desert Shield to counter Saddam Hussein (Bergen, 2001, p. 3). In this respect, bin Laden felt the occupation of Saudi Arabia (the land of the two Holy Places) by western military forces, led by the United States, was unacceptable (bin Laden, 1996a, paras 7, 14-15; bin Laden, 1996b). In fact, bin Laden was violently opposed to western presence in Saudi Arabia and believed the Prophet Muhammad “banned the permanent presence of infidels in Arabia” (Bergen, 2001, p. 3). Usama bin Laden identified the western occupation as a foundational event to the falling away of Muslims to the wrong path of living and away from righteousness by rejection of Shari’ah (bin
Laden, 1996a, paras. 10-12, 14-15; bin Laden, 1996b). Thus, a “corrective” or “reforming” movement started with the objective of rectifying the situation of having a divided Muslim body (in Arabic: ummah) on issues bin Laden found critically important, such as the suspension of Shari’ah law in favor of manmade laws, massacres against Muslims, the occupation of the lands of the two Holy Places by the Zionist-Crusader alliance, and the Saudi government as an agent-facilitator in the corruption of the ummah (Bergen, 2001, p. 3; bin Laden, 1996a-b).

To bin Laden, belief is the most important aspect in a Muslim’s life, and the ultimate belief is to defend the faith and purity of the holy lands through arms. There are multiple references to Islamic scholars by bin Laden throughout his 1996 fatwa, giving support to his declaration of war. One of the primary theologians bin Laden cites is Ibn Taymiyyah, who is famous for his ideas and understanding of Islamic jurisprudence and theology (Sharif, 2015). Ibn Taymiyyah believed that it was acceptable for violence to be committed against the enemies of Islam, an idea that is supported by the following statements:

(1) “people of Islam should join forces and support each other to get rid of the main “Kufr” who is controlling the countries of the Islamic world, even to bear the lesser damage to get rid of the major one, that is the great Kufr”(bin Laden, 1996a, para. 36).

(2) “to fight in defense of religion and Belief is a collective duty; there is no other duty after Belief than fighting the enemy who is corrupting the life and the religion. There is no preconditions for this duty and the enemy should be fought with one best abilities” (bin Laden, 1996a, para. 37).

The arabic word “kufr” translates to unbeliever or disobedient, meaning anyone who is not a Muslim and is used as a pejorative (Rajan, 2015, p. 102; Zeidan, 2001, p. 29). Bin Laden concludes the fatwa with an exhortation to all Muslims to engage in and sustain the jihad against the crusaders (bin Laden, 1996a-b). It is his belief that the combination of a just cause and Western weakness will cause a cessation of Western aggression in the lands of the two Holy Places (bin Laden, 1996a-b).
Bin Laden’s 1996 declaration of war set the tone for his 1998 fatwa where he assumed, in writing, the title of Sheikh (bin Laden, 1998). This is significant in Islamic culture, and because a Sheikh is one who leads an Islamic organization, bin Laden is therefore asserting his leadership of the global jihadist movement (Sheikh, n.d.). The opening statement of the 1998 fatwa recites verse 9:5 of the Qur’an, which is also known as the ‘verse of the sword’: “But when the forbidden months are past, then fight and slay the pagans wherever ye find them, seize them, beleaguer them, and lie in wait for them in every stratagem (of war)” (bin Laden, 1998, para. 1). In this fatwa, bin Laden reiterates the grievances laid out in the 1996 declaration on issues requiring a course correction. However, it is of particular importance to note that bin Laden’s position on the jihad had evolved to the point where it became an “individual duty” of Muslims to kill Americans and their allies, wherever they may be found (bin Laden, 1998, para. 11).

Key GJM Leaders and Groups

**Usama bin Laden and al Qa’ida.** Usama bin Laden and al Qa’ida, which means “the base,” are the most important figures in the global jihad because they are credited with spawning the ideology that guides the global jihad (Braniff & Moghadam, 2011; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004; Caruso, 2001). Consistently in academic literature, and in testimony from top government officials, al Qa’ida and bin Laden are identified as the key group and leader respectively (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004; Braniff & Moghadam, 2011; Hoffman, 2004; Jenkins, 2002; Cronin, 2008; Saul 2005). Bin Laden’s time as a mujahid during the Afghan-Soviet war was a formative experience; his background was instrumental in his successes in providing logistical support for the mujahideen, as well as setting the conditions for the future (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004; Braniff & Moghadam, 2011). On assuming leadership of the World Islamic Front, the publication of bin Laden’s fatwas – most
notably the 1996 Declaration of War – solidified the guiding principles, or ideas, of the global jihad (bin Laden, 1996a-b).

The embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam were, as an organization, al Qa’ida’s first major operational successes. Even though planning had been going on for many years, these incidents occurred less than a month after bin Laden’s 1998 fatwa (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004, pp.68-70). The U.S.S. Cole bombing in 2000 helped al Qa’ida with their inform and influence activities, to which bin Laden credits as a media victory (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004; Byman, 2012, p. 5; Eickelman, 2003, p. 3).

The incidents most infamously tied to al Qa’ida, and perhaps the most well-known of all incidents considered to be terrorism, are the 9/11 attacks. On that day, al Qa’ida killed and wounded thousands of people, effectively becoming the de facto face of terrorism.

For many years al Qa’ida had been the unequivocal leader of the global jihadist movement; however, recently a different organization has dominated the media coverage of terrorism. For al Qa’ida, though, given its history and organizational longevity, they are still a force with which to contend and, if they are able to conduct a major strike, will be able to regain some credibility (Zelin, 2014b, p. 8; Clapper, 2016).

Abu Bakr al Baghdadi and the Islamic State. In 2004, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), or the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), was an affiliate of al Qa’ida and known by two names: al Qa’ida in the Land of Two Rivers or al Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI) (Zelin, 2014b, p. 1). Abu Bakr al Baghdadi is the highly-educated leader of ISIL, receiving his Ph.D. in Islamic Studies (Chulov, 2014; SITE Staff, 2014; Zelin, 2014a; Arango & Schmitt, 2014). It is perhaps most ironic that the organization directly challenging al Qa’ida’s supremacy as the leader of the global jihadist movement came from within al Qa’ida itself. Zelin (2014b) predicts
that the future leader of the GJM will be one of these two organizations, either ISIL or al Qa’ida, and that their success is dependent upon the preservation and longevity of organizational leadership (p. 8). In 2014, ISIL declared the creation of a Caliphate in Syria and Iraq (Weaver, 2014). Al Baghdadi’s new name is Caliph Ibrahim, owing to the fact that he is now leader of the Islamic State (SITE Intelligence Group, 2014). This was an extraordinary event that, for some, gave ISIL immense credibility; however, to others it did the opposite and was seen as an act of hubris (Weaver, 2014). Ultimately, to the jihadists, “the restoration of the Caliphate” signals to the world that, as the supreme religion, Islam will “rule over the entire world” (Mozaffari, 2007, p. 23). This action alone has caused ISIL to become the “preeminent” terror group today (Clapper, 2016).

On the ground, the civil war in Syria has presented jihadis and jihadist organizations with a unique and unmistakable opportunity to develop their skills, particularly in tactical operations. ISIL is particularly known for their brutal tactics, beheading journalists, setting military prisoners on fire, and committing atrocities across the region (Weaver, 2014; Sharma, 2015). In addition, ISIL has a robust military capability with more than 36,000 foreign fighters, battling the Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police toe-to-toe, taking control of large areas of land and cities such as Mosul, Ramadi, and Fallujah (Clapper, 2016). Ultimately, according to Zelin (2014b), the tactical gains made by ISIL on the ground gave them the strategic advantage ideologically when declaring a Caliphate; and it has also given ISIL resources to counter al Qa’ida and defeat other possible opposition (p. 7).

**Mullahs Mohammad Omar, Akhtar Mansour, and the Taliban.** The Taliban, which in Pashto means “students,” have been in power in Afghanistan since 1996 when it took over control of Kabul (NCTC, 2016e; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004, p. 65). The
Taliban have, from their establishment, advocated an independent, yet radical version of Islam (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004, p. 64; Bergen, 2011). Mullah Muhammad Omar was the organization’s founder and leader of the Taliban; he is also responsible for the Taliban’s ideological positions (Bergen, 2011; Rashid, 1999). In fact, it was bin Laden who pledged an allegiance to Mullah Omar, calling him the “Commander of the Faithful” (Bergen, p. 9, 2011). Such an act of subordination is likely due to their unique and cement role in the global jihad. The relationship between bin Laden, Mullah Omar, and Jalaluddin Haqqani is noted to be foundational to the regional alliance for jihadism (Bergen, 2011); it is noted that before bin Laden, the Taliban did not have a pan-Islamism rhetoric (Rashid, 1999, p. 8). After Mullah Omar’s death in 2013, Mullah Mansour assumed leadership of the organization (Miller, 2016).

With the Taliban in power, Afghanistan was a major sanctuary for terror groups, being referred to as the “world capital of jihadist terrorism” (Bergen, 2011, p. 3; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004, p. 66). Their “Islamist model” is unique because their role in the GJM is unique: it is a byproduct of Afghanistan as the capital of the global jihad (Rashid, 1999, p. 2; Bergen, 2011). Jihadists from around the globe came to train with the Taliban in order to replicate the 1977 coup of Afghanistan, which was a model for “jihadist revolution” (Rashid, 1999, p. 2). The Taliban, after having endured the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, are now dispersed throughout the country and conduct an insurgency¹ throughout the region (Stenersen, 2010). Tactically, the Taliban began their insurgency conducting small group small arms attacks, while sometimes using rockets and other explosives to augment their lethality (Stenersen, 2010). In addition to the continuing small group attacks, the Taliban is attempting to counter security forces on equal conventional footing: in other words, they are trying to take back and hold land

¹Insurgency is defined by Fearon and Laitin (2001) as, “small, lightly armed bands practicing guerrilla warfare from rural base areas” (p. 2, 7).
(Stenersen, 2010). Also, of note and according to research, the suicide bomber in Afghanistan was “virtually unknown” prior to 2001 (Stenersen, 2010, p. 26). Such a tactic is highly effective given an attacker’s ability to get close to the intended target. Ultimately, and even though the Taliban have declared Afghanistan to be an Islamic Emirate, they have not carried out transnational attacks and consequently, are limited to rising to the level of being able to assert a commanding leadership of the movement.

**Abubakar Shekau and Boko Haram.** Boko Haram has, in one form or another, been organizationally active since the 1990s; however, it was not until 2009 that the organization existed in its ‘modern’ form (NCTC, 2016). The group calls itself the “Group of the Sunni People for the Calling and Jihad” (in Arabic: Jama’atu Ahl as-Sunnah li-Da’awati wal-Jihad) (Schoonover, 2013; NCTC, 2016). It is widely referred to as Boko Haram, which means “Western education is forbidden” (NCTC, 2016). Since 2010, it has been publicly known that Abubakar Shekau is the leader of Boko Haram because he had been previously thought to be killed by security forces (Karmon, 2014, para. 8). Shekau, who is known to be a scholar of Islam and able to speak classical Arabic, is considered to be the key threat by the U.S. in the region (Karman, 2014, para. 34). In 2010, Boko Haram pledged allegiance to al Qa’ida, likely due to an attempt to gain further standing in the global jihad (NCTC, 2016). In 2015, Boko Haram fell away from this declaration and pledged allegiance to ISIL, an opponent of al Qa’ida’s leadership in the movement (Alkhshali & Almasy, 2015; NCTC, 2016). Thus, in an act of affirming their dedication to al Baghdadi, Boko Haram have renamed themselves as the Islamic State of West Africa (Weiss, 2016; TRAC, 2016).

Boko Haram’s consistent organizational development of their operational capacity has led to “unprecedented levels of violence” in the region (NCTC, 2016). Boko Haram’s tactics
displayed a marked shift in 2013 (Zenn & Pearson, 2014). Before 2013, Boko Haram developed capabilities in traditional guerilla attacks and were adept in their execution, using small arms attacks and bombs in operations against their government targets, most of which were “police stations and patrols” (Forest, 2012, p. 68). The particular animus of Boko Haram toward security forces is likely due to the “extrajudicial killing” of their former leader, Muhammad Yousef (Agbiboa, 2013). Interestingly, it was not until 2013 that Boko Haram rose to general public awareness. This was mainly due to the utter horror following reports of hundreds of girls being kidnapped by the group and the State Department being late in categorizing the group as a foreign terrorist organization (Kessler, 2014). The shift in targeting women appears to be directly related to the arrest of many relatives of Boko Haram members who are women and are ostensibly objects with which to make prisoner exchanges (Zenn & Pearson, 2014). Additionally, Boko Haram is cited with increasing levels of gender-based violence toward the Christian female population of Nigeria (Zenn & Pearson, 2014). As a whole, Boko Haram is a quintessential example of the GJM: both in ideology and in operation. It is unlikely, though, they will ever be considered the ‘leader’ of the global jihad, given their consistent subordination and declarations of allegiance.

**Key Shifts in the Movement**

**Inclusion in the Jihad.** The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), published by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), summarizes intelligence reporting on certain issues of security importance. The most recently declassified NIE from 2006 chiefly assesses the impact of Islamic terror groups (ODNI, 2006, p. 1). The global jihadist movement is the key phenomenon in the publication’s analysis, to which al Qa’ida is identified as its de facto leader under Salafi-jihadism (ODNI, 2006, pp. 1, 4, 12). The Salafi-Jihad, defined by experts as a
religion, identical to the one that evolved from historical effects of globalism, is the core ideology of al Qaeda (Moghadam, 2008, p. 14). TheSalafi-Jihadist model for recruiting through highly selective criteria has been displaced in the contemporary operating environment as a matter of necessity (Lee, 2015; Braniff & Moghadam, 2011). Instead, the movement has displaced the old Salafi-Jihadist model by changing the approach to recruiting, casting a wide net across the globe in order to find the self-radicalized or to catch and radicalize individuals to their cause. This change is characterized by Braniff and Moghadam as ‘ideological dilution’ (2011, para. 17). Ultimately, this shift has created an extremely challenging environment for security services to operate in, due to the difficulty of identifying whether or not an individual presents a credible terrorist threat (Rabasa et al., 2006).

The Post-9/11 World and Geographic Dispersion. Braniff and Moghadam (2011) also address a change in “strategic, ideological, and structural adaptation[s]” made by al Qaeda in the post-9/11 operational environment (para. 1). Many experts agree that there is a pre and post-9/11 al Qaeda when it comes to operational patterns and trends (Braniff & Moghadam, 2011; O’Brien, 2011). The shift in al Qaeda has less to do with a successful attack and more to do with the greatly increased attention directed at the organization, requiring operational changes to preserve their existence (Monaco, 2013; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004). To this point, denying the global jihadist movement a haven in Afghanistan has required al Qaeda, affiliates, associates, and adherents, to geographically disperse while retaining a common ideology (Braniff & Moghadam, 2011, para. 4-8). One of the most significant evolutions of al Qaeda is the development of media and communications infrastructure to facilitate better mission readiness and capability (Braniff & Moghadam, 2011). This evolution occurred out of necessity and due to geographic dispersion.
Shortly after Usama bin Laden’s death in 2011, Braniff and Moghadam defined the global jihadist movement as an al Qa’ida-led, transnational operation, unified under the common purpose of jihad (Braniff & Moghadam, 2011, fn. 2). The movement is geographically located in, or attracted to, conflict hot-spots such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and the Philippines, among many others; this geographic orientation has caused it to become diffused and organizationally restrictive (ODNI, 2006, p. 1). Hegghammer (2006) asserts that Iraq gave jihadis an operational environment after losing Afghanistan. Additionally, the explosion of new radical groups and self-radicalized cells with unified purpose over these geographically dispersed environments, will challenge security services in liaison coordination and multilateral efforts to stop terrorism (ODNI, 2006, pp. 5-6). Therefore, without a robust counterterrorism effort, jihadi groups in Africa and Southeast Asia will likely be able to develop their capabilities and expand their operational capacity (ODNI, 2006, p. 7).

**A Caliphate is Declared.** Perhaps the global jihadist movement’s greatest vulnerability is their ultimate objective of a supranational Caliphate, guided by Shari’ah, which is an unpopular idea among mainstream Muslims who are “the most powerful weapon in the war on terror” (ODNI, 2006, pp. 5-6). Hegghammer (2006) juxtaposes this assessment by asserting jihadist groups realize they must develop strategic vision to accomplish their goal of a supranational Caliphate and defeat the West (Hegghammer, 2006, pp. 11, 14, 28-29, 31-32). Overall, Braniff and Moghadam conclude that there are two battles: one physical and one ideological. The growing inclusiveness of the al Qa’ida fight against the West will pose immediate physical challenges to practitioners. Policymakers must be calculated in the discourse they use in order to bring progressive Muslims in on the counter-jihad fight (Braniff & Moghadam, 2011, para. 41). Dr. Zuhdi Jasser, of the American Islamic Forum for Democracy, is
an example of a Muslim leader who believes in a “progressive, forward-thinking interpretation of Islam” (AIFD, n.d.; Lemons, 2015, para. 6). Leaders such as Dr. Jasser are key in what has been called “the war of ideas” (Rossenau, 2006).

**Quantitative Research of the GJM**

Although the aforementioned literature is instructive and necessary for context, it lacks systematic quantification of the global jihadist movement. One exception, LaFree and Dugan’s contribution on global terrorism trends, finds that 13 of the 20 deadliest terror groups are what they refer to as “Islamic” (2015, p. 5). Of the top five deadliest groups, all are within this category (LaFree & Dugan, 2015). It is interesting to note the geographical dispersion of these top five groups, which supports the NIE assessment. Two are located in the AfPak (Afghanistan-Pakistan) region: the Taliban and Tehrik-Taliban Pakistan. One is located near the Arabian gulf, that of ISIL, while two are located in Africa, Boko Haram and al Shabaab. Al Qa’ida is noticeably low on the lethality list at number 18, with their allies and affiliates occupying top spots. This study not only looks at compositional factors, but also operational factors. These are perhaps the most important conclusions for counterterrorism practitioners and policymakers. Operationally, terror groups are disproportionately conducting bombings and armed attacks and their targeting favors police and military (LaFree & Dugan, 2015, pp. 7, 10, 13). On the other hand, Islamic groups, when compared to non-Islamic groups, are much likelier to target citizens (LaFree & Dugan, 2015, p. 8).

Another important exception to the deficit of quantitative research on the scope of the GJM is that of Barros and Proenca (2005), who use a mixed logit model to estimate the characteristics of attacks. Their study, which uses data from 1979-2002, looks at attacks that occurred in Europe, the United States, and Canada. Ultimately, they find that radical Islamic
attacks use explosive bombs more than all other attack types; however, they prefer assassination much more than non-Islamic groups (Barros & Proenca, 2005, p. 301). On the average, Barros and Proenca also find that radical Islamic attacks produce far more casualties than their counterparts, though it is asserted 9/11 attacks potentially skew that conclusion. The authors also find that counterterrorism policy specifically targeting radical Islamic terrorism must be permanent given the persistent nature of the threat (Barros & Proenca, 2005, pp. 310-311).

Despite the incredible value each of these studies provide, there is a necessity to address items to which they are lacking. LaFree and Dugan’s (2015) study provides descriptive conclusions about a grouping of radical Islamic terror groups, but not the broader global jihadist movement. In other words, their study uses a small sample of groups (n=20), based off of lethality, and then determines whether or not the group’s ideology aligns with the definition of radical Islamic terrorism. Barros and Proenca’s (2005) research employs the ITERATE (International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events) database of events and terrorist groupings. While this study is an important piece of the extant literature, post-9/11 trends and patterns are missed and the study focuses on the operational environment (OE) of the West (Europe, United States, Canada), with no attention given to the Middle East, South Asia, or Southeast Asia. In addition, this work concludes through a logical (and likely correct) framework that any terror incident in this OE must be radical, despite using the database’s broader terror grouping.

**Current Study**

This paper seeks to address an important gap in the current state of research through a quantitative analysis of the global jihadist movement. Previous studies of the GJM have examined its qualitative components such as evolving tactics and organizational structures
(Braniff & Moghadam, 2011; Zelin, 2014b; Stenersen, 2010; Hegghammer 2006; Pantucci, 2011). The extant empirical research of the movement has limited application, failing to examine terrorism as the primary outcome (Mousseau, 2011; Torres, Jordán, & Horsburgh, 2006). Other important work assesses policy targeted killings (Hepworth, 2014; Wilner, 2010) or complex insurgency-counterinsurgency relationships (Condra and Shapiro, 2012; Fielding and Shortland, 2010), but even these investigations typically center on one country (Linke, Witmer, O’Loughlin, 2012), one group (Forest, 2012; Stenersen, 2010), and/or one time period (Haddad, 2004). The two aforementioned exceptions that are particularly relevant to this study, LaFree and Dugan (2015) and Barros and Proenca (2005), are valued contributions, but lack the broader scope needed to answer, “What is the threat of the GJM movement?” Building upon this important research, the current study aims to systematically operationalize the GJM and present basic trends and patterns of the movement over the last twenty years. In its entirety, this study will address the notable deficits found in the review of the literature by: (1) operationalizing the global jihadist movement through its comprehensive examination of history, ideology, key groups, and key shifts, (2) quantitatively estimating terrorism trends in the global jihadist movement, and in particular, (3) view both components from a global perspective.
CHAPTER 3
DATA AND METHODS

Data

**Global Terrorism Database.** The Global Terrorism Database (GTD), an open-source collection of terrorist incidents managed by National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) and funded by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is the most comprehensive and inclusive database currently available. This study utilized a January 2016 download of the GTD, which includes data from 1970 to 2014 and identifies 141,966 incidents which have been collected through open source methods ranging from newspapers, wire services, and government reports. The GTD is superior to any other terrorism dataset given its scope, which includes attacks that qualify as both domestic and international. The GTD is also favorable for international terrorism research given the volume of terrorist incidents catalogued in its database.

The GTD operates from a terrorism definition of “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence to attain a political, economic, religious or social goal through fear, coercion or intimidation” (LaFree & Dugan, 2007, p. 186). This definition is translated to mandatory criteria of a rational act of violence committed by a “subnational” actor (START, 2013). In addition, there are three screening criteria a researcher can use, although two of the three must be present for the incident to be in these data. First, the act must have some ideological goal, be it political, religious, economic or social in nature. Second, the act must intimidate a target population or intend to be aimed at a larger audience. Third, the act will not conform to sanctioned violence in accordance with the Laws of Armed Conflict and International Humanitarian Law.
**Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium.** The Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium (TRAC) is a leading open-source research database that focuses on identifying terror groups across the globe by providing current and relevant information regarding composition, disposition, and ideology of groups. There are 2,800 experts, from scholars to practitioners, who contribute to this database to provide a useful analytic tool both academics and practitioners (TRAC, 2016a). Given this plethora of expertise, TRAC has become invaluable when assessing whether or not a terror group could be considered part of the global jihadist movement.

**Sample**

This study first generated a global sample of incidents from 1994 to 2014 (n=87,317) (see Appendix A to see a complete list of identified groups). This date range was chosen in order to avoid the documented issues with the lost 1993 data, along with the inherent importance of this timeframe to the global jihadist movement (START, 2013; LaFree & Dugan, 2015; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004, p. 59). Second, 571 groups were identified from the 3,188 total organizations represented in the GTD that appear to be GJM or GJM-based terrorist groups, either in name or operational activity. This list was refined in two processes. First, a group must meet definitional requirements based on McCauley and Moskalenko’s (2014, p. 70) conceptualization of the global jihadist movement. There is room in the McCauley and Moskalenko definition for inclusion of groups that are nationalistic, though Islamic, in nature. Therefore, in order for a group to be included in the final list of GJM affiliated groups, it must also possess two of three following qualities: radical, jihadi, and transnational or international. Radical groups use violence to support and propagate a fundamentalist, literal interpretation of Islamic texts; Jihadi groups are focused on fighting the west in order to impose Shari’ah law by
organizing an Islamic state; and international groups have a global goal to bring the jihad to the unbeliever in the West.

The TRAC database and source documents in the GTD were instrumental in determining whether or not each group had the appropriate profile for GJM affiliation. For example, groups that were Islamic but had an overarching nationalistic purpose, even if violent, were omitted. For example, Ahlu Sunna Waljama'a (ASWJ), a Islamic militant group operating in Somalia is screened from inclusion because their ideology is nationalist in nature and operations counter al Qa’ida’s affiliate, al Shabaab, and others, in the region (TRAC, 2016; Stanford Mapping Militant Organizations, 2012). Other groups with an inconclusive affiliation were also omitted from inclusion in the GJM. For example, Afghan War Veterans and Avenge the Arab Nation were not included because of vague group names and/or lack of documentation. Ultimately, 287 groups were coded as GJM affiliated (see Appendix A to see a complete list of identified groups). All incidents with an unknown group name in the GTD are omitted from the entire sample (n=48,987). Without an extensive individual assessment due to a lack of source documentation, it is impossible to ascertain affiliation assignment for each event in the sample with an unknown actor (see Appendix A to see a complete list of identified groups). From 1994 to 2014, and with unknown groups excluded, this study arrives at the final inclusive sample size of n=38,330, with n=17,026 designated affiliated, and n=21,304 designated unaffiliated.

**Group Inclusion Fidelity.** Groups that eventually were included as part of the global jihadist movement in the study were then cross referenced with group lists in the extant literature and proved to have a high degree of fidelity. Both Carson’s (2016) study on the efficacy of targeting killings and LaFree and Dugan’s (2015) study on the recent surge of Islamic terrorism each have identified group lists. Carson utilized four main sources (Terrorist Organization
Profiles, William Brantiff’s congressional testimony, Stanford’s Mapping Militant Organizations, and the Taliban/al Qa’ida Sanctions United Nations Committee) which identified 74 groups for inclusion (2016, p. 7). LaFree and Dugan named 13 violent Islamic groups in their study (LaFree & Dugan, 2015). Every group that LaFree and Dugan identify are included in this study in the global jihadist movement and all in Carson’s study were included with the exception of four, due to not meeting the established global jihadist movement ideological thresholds. These four organizations are: Ansar Allah, Ansar Sarallah, Lashkar e Balochistan, and Pattani United Liberation Organization (see Appendix A to see a complete list of identified groups).

Ansar Allah, Lashkar e Balochistan, Pattani United Liberation Organization were determined to be more nationalistic or separatist. The lack of source documentation about Ansar Sarallah led to its exclusion from GJM affiliation.

Measures

Affiliation. The primary independent variable of this investigation is whether or not a terror act between 1994-2014 is considered to be committed in the name of the global jihadist movement. This variable is operationalized as a categorical variable, where events not affiliated with the GJM are coded 0 and those with GJM affiliation are coded 1.

Dependent variables. There are four important outcome variables for this study: individuals killed (nkill), wounded (nwound), events with damage (property), and suicide attacks (suicide). The GTD inputs the data of individuals killed and wounded as numeric variables, therefore the total number of individuals killed (including attacker) and non-fatal injuries are attributed to the incident (START, 2013, pp. 46-47). Property damage is a categorical variable with three assigned values (0, 1, and -9). For this variable, 0 indicates no damage, 1 indicates damage done, and -9 indicates that it is unknown whether or not damage resulted from the
incident (START, 2013, p. 48). Lastly, suicide attacks are coded as a categorical variable where 0 indicates no evidence of suicide and 1 indicates the incident was a suicide attack. For chi-squared analysis, I transformed the two numerical variables of individuals killed and wounded into additional categorical variables, where 0 indicates no one killed or wounded and 1 indicates someone was killed or wounded. For incidents with missing data for individuals killed and wounded, the value -9 was used. In the chi-squared analysis of individuals killed, individuals wounded, and property damage, listwise deletion was used for incidents with the -9 value.

**Chi-squared test**

A chi-square test was employed to determine whether or not there is any statistical significance in the number of individuals killed, wounded, and acts with property damage (as categorical variables) relative to affiliation by confirming or rejecting the null hypothesis (Triola, 2014, pp. 605-606). For this study, there are four null hypotheses:

- $H_{0a}$: There is no relationship between incident affiliation and observed frequencies of incidents with individuals killed.
- $H_{0b}$: There is no relationship between incident affiliation and observed frequencies of incidents with individuals wounded.
- $H_{0c}$: There is no relationship between incident affiliation and observed frequencies of incidents with property damage.
- $H_{0d}$: There is no relationship between incident affiliation and observed frequencies of incidents with suicide attacks.

For the chi-square test, this study took the sum of the following equation $(O_i - E_i)^2/E_i$ relative to all possible outcomes for each dependent variable, where $O_i$ is observed frequency of incidents and $E_i$ are expected frequency of incidents (Triola, 2014, pp. 605-606). For each null hypothesis there are two possible outcomes, yielding one degree of freedom. The critical value for this test is 3.841, given a significance level of 5 percent.
Chapter 4
Results

Descriptive Trends

Table 1 provides an overview of individuals killed, wounded, and incident for the study’s date range. With only 44.4% of incidents being affiliated with the GJM, the majority of individuals killed and wounded are tied to the movement (58.6% and 60.2%, respectively). Contrarily, the majority of events are unaffiliated with the movement at 55.6%, claiming only 41.4% of deaths and 39.8% of the wounded. Referencing Table 2, we see the summary statistics of the average killed and wounded per attack by year. The trends for terror acts unaffiliated with the global jihadist movement are relatively stable. From 1994-2014, the mean killed and wounded per attack are 2.868 and 3.456 respectively (Table 2). The summary trends for terror acts affiliated with the global jihadist movement are different, with a higher degree of volatility observed for the date range. From 1994-2014, the mean killed and wounded per attack for the global jihadist movement are 5.098 and 8.816 respectively (reference Table 2).

Table 1. Summary Statistics for Terror Incidents 1994-2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Killed</th>
<th>Wounded</th>
<th>Incidents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GJM Affiliation?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>77422</td>
<td>99216</td>
<td>17026 44.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>54744</td>
<td>65787</td>
<td>21304 55.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>132165</td>
<td>164913</td>
<td>38330</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are three major outliers in the data that represent the majority of fatalities and injuries. In 1998, the embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam are representative of the spike in average wounded per attack. The September 11th attacks explain the high average killed per attack for 2001. Lastly, the increased in average wounded for 2004 is representative of the
War in Iraq turning from a decisive action conflict to a counterinsurgency, with the Battles of Fallujah and Mosul, among others, occurring in 2004 (reference Figures 1 and 2, Table 2).

**Figure 1: Average of Individuals Killed per Terror Event by Affiliation from 1994-2014**

**Figure 2: Average of Individuals Wounded per Terror Event by Affiliation from 1994-2014**
Table 2. Summary Statistics of Average Casualty Rate Per Attack of Global Jihadist Movement Affiliated and Unaffiliated Attacks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Global Jihadist Movement</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Unaffiliated with GJM</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Average killed</td>
<td>Average wounded</td>
<td>Average killed</td>
<td>Average wounded</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>1.896</td>
<td>3.005</td>
<td>3.050</td>
<td>2.450</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>1.846</td>
<td>4.276</td>
<td>3.177</td>
<td>8.709</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>2.652</td>
<td>9.815</td>
<td>3.311</td>
<td>4.225</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>8.558</td>
<td>6.522</td>
<td>4.084</td>
<td>2.912</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2.747</td>
<td>4.031</td>
<td>2.835</td>
<td>2.957</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>19.594</td>
<td>7.426</td>
<td>2.844</td>
<td>2.482</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>5.960</td>
<td>10.508</td>
<td>3.995</td>
<td>4.053</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>8.446</td>
<td>20.642</td>
<td>4.575</td>
<td>5.561</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>4.897</td>
<td>11.319</td>
<td>1.985</td>
<td>3.760</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>3.123</td>
<td>5.896</td>
<td>3.018</td>
<td>3.208</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>3.356</td>
<td>5.024</td>
<td>1.877</td>
<td>4.302</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>4.557</td>
<td>9.229</td>
<td>2.071</td>
<td>1.940</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>3.781</td>
<td>6.861</td>
<td>1.226</td>
<td>1.037</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>3.828</td>
<td>6.050</td>
<td>1.128</td>
<td>1.248</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>3.434</td>
<td>4.644</td>
<td>1.340</td>
<td>2.363</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>4.078</td>
<td>5.493</td>
<td>1.278</td>
<td>1.942</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>5.438</td>
<td>3.522</td>
<td>2.277</td>
<td>1.890</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>x</td>
<td><strong>5.098</strong></td>
<td><strong>8.816</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.868</strong></td>
<td><strong>3.456</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3 illustrates the top 15 countries most affected by terrorism by a measure of terror incidents worldwide. Of particular note is the presence of two countries who have experienced frequent terrorism, but not any associated with the global jihadist movement. In the cases of Colombia (narco-terrorism, e.g. FARC) and Sri Lanka (separatists, e.g. LTTE), all of their terror incidents are unaffiliated. For India, the country with the highest incidence of terror acts, the overwhelming majority (90.6%) are unaffiliated with the global jihadist movement. Turkey and the United Kingdom follow India’s pattern. Countries with the majority of terror acts affiliated with the global jihadist movement are: Afghanistan (98.5%), Iraq (92.1%), Pakistan (67.3%), Somalia (96.7%), Nigeria (79.2%), Algeria (88.4%), and Yemen (68.3%).
### Table 3. Top 15 Countries by Frequency of Terror Acts from 1994-2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Global Jihadist Movement</th>
<th>Unaffiliated with GJM</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>4140</td>
<td>4571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>4355</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>4422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>2416</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>2623</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>1666</td>
<td>811</td>
<td>2477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2453</td>
<td>2453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>685</td>
<td>1224</td>
<td>1909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>1574</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>1627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>1251</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>1579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>1187</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>1343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>782</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>1145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1044</td>
<td>1044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>787</td>
<td>810</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>686</td>
<td>696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bank and Gaza</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>610</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 4. Top 15 Groups Tied to the Global Jihadist Movement by Frequency from 1994-2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group Name</th>
<th>Number of Attacks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taliban</td>
<td>4258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)*</td>
<td>2442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Shabaab</td>
<td>1737</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boko Haram</td>
<td>1301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)</td>
<td>1042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)</td>
<td>755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algerian Islamic Extremists</td>
<td>373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement)</td>
<td>352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)</td>
<td>330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)</td>
<td>311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Gama’at al-Islamiyya (IG)</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Islamic Group (GIA)</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Qa’ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQILIM)</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hizballah</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salafist Group for Preaching and Fighting (GSPC)</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GROUP TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>13826</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI) was an earlier group name of ISIL. Their attack numbers are combined.
** 13826 of 17013 overall attacks (80.1%) are attributed to the top 15 groups affiliated with the global jihadist movement.
Table 4 lists the 15 most prolific GJM terror groups between 1994-2014 by frequency of attacks. The Taliban, who operate mainly in the AfPak region, are uncontestably the most consistent for the global jihadist movement. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), who have also operated under the names Tawhid and Jihad, al Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI), and the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), is ranked with the second highest amount of attacks in this 20 year period (TRAC, 2016; NCTC, 2016). This is particularly troublesome because ISIL have only come into operational maturity in about the last three years. Al Shabaab and Boko Haram are ranked third and fourth, as two terror groups operating in Africa. Al Shabaab is one of al Qa’ida’s main affiliates in Africa, with their operational area as Somalia/Horn of Africa (NCTC, 2016). Boko Haram was an al Qa’ida affiliate, until they pledged allegiance to ISIL. Boko Haram operates primarily in Nigeria and accounts for nearly all of the country’s terror acts affiliated with the global jihadist movement (NCTC, 2016). Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, a group that also conducts operations in AfPak against the Pakistani government, round out the top five groups and those with over one thousand attacks (NCTC, 2016). It is important to note that while these last four groups have such a high rank on this list, they have not been operating long. Yet still, they have been extremely prolific in terms of the number of attacks. This might not speak particularly to lethality, but it is indicative of operational capacity.

Figure 3 examines the frequency of incidents by affiliation across time. Until 2012, terror events unaffiliated with the global jihadist movement have been relatively steady with slight variations up and down. However, incidents have trended upward the last three years with percent change by year at 22.0% (2012 n=1280), 17.5% (2013 n=1504), and 108.8% (2014 n=3140). However, when viewed as percent change from the pivot year of 2012 the change is much more dramatic with a yearly exponential trend seen at 22.0%, 43.4%, and 199.3%,
respectively. The trend for incidents for the global jihadist movement from 1994-2014 follow a different arc. Unsurprisingly, 2001 seems to be the year where an upward trend starts with terror incidents, elevating in 2004, and rising exponentially in 2012. In the last three years, the percent change of incidents by year is 182.6% (2012 n=2413), 4.8% (2013 n=2528), and 92.8% (2014 n=4874). However, as before, if the percent change is viewed from 2012 the exponential trend is numbing with yearly change seen at 182.6%, 195.7%, and 470.1% respectively.

Table 5. Attack Type for Global Jihadist Movement Terror Acts versus Others

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attack Type</th>
<th>GJM affiliated</th>
<th>GJM unaffiliated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armed Assault</td>
<td>4499 43.0%</td>
<td>5959 57.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assassination</td>
<td>1206 51.7%</td>
<td>1126 48.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombing/Explosion</td>
<td>8173 49.9%</td>
<td>8197 50.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostage</td>
<td>1496 40.6%</td>
<td>2190 59.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facility/Infrastructure</td>
<td>480 18.7%</td>
<td>2085 81.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1172 40.2%</td>
<td>1747 59.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>17026</strong></td>
<td><strong>21304</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6. **Target Type for Global Jihadist Movement Terror Acts versus Others**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target Type</th>
<th>GJM affiliated</th>
<th>GJM unaffiliated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military &amp; Police</td>
<td>6634 54.7%</td>
<td>5495 45.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Citizens &amp; Property</td>
<td>4703 44.9%</td>
<td>5782 55.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>1969 39.9%</td>
<td>2972 60.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>933 26.5%</td>
<td>2582 73.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation &amp; Systems</td>
<td>507 27.2%</td>
<td>1357 72.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Institution</td>
<td>500 51.2%</td>
<td>476 48.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>513 54.9%</td>
<td>422 45.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorists/NSA&amp;M*</td>
<td>423 62.0%</td>
<td>259 38.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>844 30.1%</td>
<td>1961 69.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Non-state Actors and Militia (NSA&M)*

| TOTAL                    | 17026         | 21304            |

Tables 5 and 6 represent the attack and target types between those affiliated and unaffiliated with the global jihadist movement. Both affiliated and unaffiliated incidents seem to favor armed assaults (n=4499 and n=5959) and attacks that utilize bombings/explosions (n=8173 and n=8197). A comparative look reveals that there is a relatively even distribution of across affiliation, with one exception: facility attacks (unaffiliated favored at 81.3%). Table 6 shows target type preference across incident affiliation. Unsurprisingly, military and police (n=6634 and n=5495), government (n=1969 and n=2972), and private citizens (n=4703 and n=5782) are the main target types for all terror acts. Contrarily, it is surprising that the targeting of businesses and transportation systems are actually skewed toward unaffiliated acts (favored at 73.5% and 72.8%, respectively), given the targets of 9/11 and its effect on the United States in business and transportation.

Table 7 shows favored weapon types for acts, again disaggregated by affiliation. Perhaps unsurprisingly, terrorists favor attacks with explosives (n=8968 and n=8576) and firearms (n=5384 and n=7054), which is reflective of what is found in favored attack types. In other words, there appears to be a relationship between the type of weapon used and types of attacks,
which could possibly be explained on definitional grounds. For example, explosive attacks use bombs and armed attacks use firearms. Of preferred weapon types, incendiary attacks is the only category heavily skewed toward unaffiliated acts at 82.7%.

Table 7. Weapon Type for Global Jihadist Movement Terror Acts versus Others

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapon Type</th>
<th>GJM affiliated</th>
<th>GJM unaffiliated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Explosives</td>
<td>8968 51.1%</td>
<td>8576 48.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firearms</td>
<td>5384 43.3%</td>
<td>7054 56.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incendiary</td>
<td>453  17.3%</td>
<td>2164 82.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melee</td>
<td>431  37.5%</td>
<td>718  62.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>1737 39.7%</td>
<td>2641 60.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>53   26.0%</td>
<td>151  74.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>17026</td>
<td>21304</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-squared analysis

Table 8 provides the results for the chi-square test, which indicate that there is a significant statistical relationship between the independent variable and each tested dependent variable. Thus, given the $\chi^2$ values for individuals killed, wounded, property damage, and suicide attacks, relative to the constant critical value, each of the null hypotheses must be rejected. The observed chi-square and raw values for the first variable (individuals killed) are: $\chi^2 = 2402.027$; 11763 (56.9%) unaffiliated incidents without a death, and 8920 (43.1%) unaffiliated incidents with a death; 5040 (31.2%) affiliated incidents without a death, and 11097 (68.8%) affiliated incidents with a death. There were 1510 incidents with unknown data on individuals killed. The observed chi-square and raw values for the second variable (individuals wounded) are: $\chi^2 = 1076.274$; 13272 (66.7%) unaffiliated incidents without an injury, and 6616 (33.3%) unaffiliated incidents with an injury; 7493 (49.4%) affiliated incidents without an injury, and 7688 (50.6%) affiliated incidents with an injury. There were 3261 incidents with unknown data on individuals.
Table 8. Chi-square Analysis of Global Jihadist Movement Affiliated and Unaffiliated Incidents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>GJM Affiliation?</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KILLED</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>11763</td>
<td>56.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>8920</td>
<td>43.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>20683</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*For 1510 incidents, individuals killed unknown

<table>
<thead>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WOUNDED</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>13272</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>6616</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>19888</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*For 3261 incidents, individuals wounded unknown

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROPERTY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>7468</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>11203</td>
<td>60.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>18671</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*For 5948 incidents, property damage unknown

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>GJM Affiliation?</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUICIDE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>21042</td>
<td>98.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>21317</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
wounded. The observed chi-square and raw values for the third variable (property damage) are: $\chi^2 = 104.994$; 7468 (40.0%) unaffiliated incidents without property damage, and 11203 (60.0%) unaffiliated incidents with property damage; 6265 (45.7%) affiliated incidents without property damage, and 7446 (54.3%) affiliated incidents with property damage. There were 5948 incidents with unknown data on property damage. Lastly, the observed values for the fourth variable (suicide attacks) are: $\chi^2 = 1467.446$; 21042 (98.7%) unaffiliated incidents without suicide, and 275 (1.3%) unaffiliated incidents with suicide; 15312 (90.0%) affiliated incidents without suicide, and 1701 (10.0%) affiliated incidents with suicide. For each of the null hypotheses, there is a corresponding p-value of less than 0.0001, which makes it highly unlikely that in rejecting the null hypotheses there is a set of untrue conclusions.

Discussion

Over the last two decades, terrorism has been on the rise while dramatically spiking post-2010. It is an important note that despite a majority of terror acts in the two-decade period are unaffiliated with the global jihadist movement, a majority of individuals killed and wounded come from terrorism affiliated with the movement. On the average, and considering individuals killed and wounded in a single terror act, incidents affiliated with the global jihadist movement are 177.8% deadlier and 255.1% more wounding than acts of terror unaffiliated with the GJM. Despite the disparity between casualty rates, the proportion of attack, target, and weapon types within affiliation assignment is relatively symmetrical and consistent. Therefore, the methods of attack, targeting, and weapon use favored by terrorists are relatively similar regardless of affiliation with or without the global jihadist movement.

In the last few years, the global jihadist movement has become a dominant manifestation of terrorism. There appears to be two phases of the movement, with primary leadership coming
from Usama bin Laden and al Qa’ida for nearly 35 years; only recently does al Qa’ida’s leadership of the movement appear to be displaced by ISIL. Not only is there a core difference in ideology, but there are operational differences between the two groups as well. Al Qa’ida seems to focus attacks requiring a high amount of resources and a large degree of planning which yields high payoffs. On the other side, other groups like ISIL, Boko Haram, and al Qa’ida’s allies with the Taliban, and al-Shabaab, are more interested in frequency of attacks which cause the group to appear more prolific and present. An examination of the numbers supports this idea. For example, al Qa’ida has been assigned responsibility for 57 incidents with approximately 3,605 deaths from 1994-2014, rendering an average of 63.2 deaths per incident. This is a 761% higher average than the next highest group from the top 4 groups in Table 4. Boko Haram averages 8.3 deaths per incident (10795 deaths, 1301 incidents); ISIL averages 7.1 deaths per incident (17450 deaths, 2442 incidents); the Taliban averages 3.3 deaths per incident (14248 deaths, 4258 incidents); and Al-Shabaab averages 2.4 deaths per incident (4185 deaths, 1737 incidents).

This study sustains some findings of recent research in terrorism. Spaaj and Hamm’s (2015) study examines lone wolf terrorism, but is used as an operational tactic of the global jihadist movement, found that attacks favored targeting military and police while also favoring the use of firearms. On the whole, this study finds the global jihadist movement favors military, police, and government targets (50.5%); civilians targets are found to be second in frequency (27.6%). When it comes to weapon selection, this study finds slight difference between the lone wolf and the broader global jihad. The majority of incidents used explosives (52.7%) but a large portion used firearms (31.6%). This study also complements LaFree and Dugan’s (2015) study on global terrorism and violent Islamic extremism. Their examination centered on the lethality (those killed) of terror groups whereas this study centers on frequency of incidents.
Notwithstanding, this study finds that within the top 10 groups by frequency (without regarding affiliation), nine of LaFree and Dugan’s deadliest groups are annotated.

**Conclusion**

The study of terrorism, with particular attention to the modern phenomenon of the global jihadist movement, is vital to the formulation of effective counterterrorism policy. Deeper understanding of the complexities of the global security environment only aid in rendering positive outcomes.

The global jihadist movement can trace its foundation to the 1980s jihad in Afghanistan. It is here that Usama bin Laden became inextricably linked to the movement, claiming to be the de facto leader with the culmination of the fatwas declaring a global jihad against the West and the success of al Qa’ida’s 1998 embassy bombings. This leadership position of al Qa’ida in the movement has been recently challenged by ISIL when they declared a new Caliphate.

This study has a three main limitations. First, it is difficult to arrive at a consensus of defining the global jihadist movement. Next, this study excludes a large number of cases that cannot be attributed to a terror group and therefore be assigned affiliation. To address the first concern, this study relies on source government documents and the extant literature to guide the definition of the global jihadist movement. To address the second issue, this study handles any terror act with an unknown actor with listwise deletion in order to mitigate any possible skewing of statistical results. Furthermore, there is limitation in the study due to the large sample size, rendering proportional observed chi-square values which can result in type II error.

An additional limitation concerns the use of the GTD for its base dataset. Inherently there is the possibility of measurement error in using such a database in two manners. First, the data could be skewed modern technological advances: better communications, the internet, and television media coverage all could be responsible for a considerably higher reportage of news
stories; thus, driving the metrics of news coverage on a particular incident (in this case, terrorism) higher. Second, as Ackerman and Pinson (2016) state, there exists the possibility of credibility and validity issues which skew data. With regards to terrorism research, there are no existing data sets that evaluate source credibility and validity (Ackerman & Pinson, 2016, p. 625). Given these limitations, the GTD is still arguably the most comprehensive and well-defined open-source database of terrorist incidents in existence. Parkin and Green (2016) conclude as much by stating the GTD “collect[s] valid and reliable data from open-sources” (p. 683). Freilich and LaFree (2016) point out that many terrorism studies suffer from the potential methodological error of failing to use a comparison group (p. 572). This study highlights terrorism committed by the global jihadist movement relative to all other types of terrorism. Thus, this study incorporates Freilich and LaFree’s (2016) strategy of disaggregating the incident data by creating two separate terror groups in order to provide comparative study (p. 573).

As a whole, this study finds that from 1994-2014 a majority (55.6%) of terror incidents are unaffiliated with the global jihadist movement. The pattern of incident frequency relative to incident affiliation has changed in the last few years. From 2012-2014, incidents affiliated with the movement accounted for the majority of overall terror incidents (65.3%, 62.7%, and 60.8%, respectively). Though incidents from 1994-2014 that are affiliated with the movement account for only 44.4% of terror incidents, more individuals were killed (58.6% of total) and wounded (60.2% of total) by those incidents affiliated with the global jihadist movement. Notwithstanding, this study indicates that terror incidents regardless of affiliation follow similar arcs in attack, target, and weapon typologies. Despite affiliation with or without the movement, terror groups as a whole favor the use of explosives and firearms in their operations; moreover, terror groups favor targeting military, police, and private citizens.
These findings provide important policy implications for crafting and executing a counterterrorism strategy. First, terror incidents affiliated with the global jihadist movement are, based on the metrics of averages, more successful when it comes to lethality and wounding per attack than unaffiliated terror acts. Second, recent trending indicates the frequency of incidents affiliated with the global jihadist movement has surpassed those that are unaffiliated, thus becoming the dominant form of terrorism today. This observation is supported by the senior U.S. intelligence officer, Director Clapper, in his worldwide threat assessment. Lastly, for policy execution, when considering a target hardening strategy, countering small arms and explosives must be the priority. Undoubtedly, plans for mass casualty events that max response resources, such as a counter-WMD event, are extremely important to put in place, but the metrics show the likelihood of an attack from small arms and explosives is far greater. This means targets of opportunity, such as ‘soft targets’ -- those without physical security or countermeasures -- are favorable for terror groups’ objective success. Further study of the global jihadist movement to establish framing profiles or provide schemes for predictive analysis could be invaluable to practitioners in the field. A deeper understanding of the complexities of the global security environment will aid in rendering future positive security outcomes for all democratic societies.
PLATE 1
POINT DENSITY MAP OF TERROR INCIDENTS AFFILIATED WITH
THE GLOBAL JIHADIST MOVEMENT, 1994-2014
PLATE 2
POINT DENSITY MAP OF TERROR INCIDENTS UNAFFILIATED WITH
THE GLOBAL JIHADIST MOVEMENT, 1994-2014
REFERENCES


http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/4119~v~Al-Qaeda_the_Taliban___Other_Extremist_Groups_in_Afghanistan_and_Pakistan__Testimony_before_the_US_Senate_Committee_on_Foreign_Relations_by_Peter_Ber.pdf


Carson, J. V. (2016). The role of targeting killings in the 'War on Terror'.


http://docs.house.gov/meetings/HM/HM00/20140917/102616/HHRG-113-HM00-Wstate-ComeyJ-20140917.pdf


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## APPENDIX A

### LIST OF GROUPS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected Groups</th>
<th>Considered Groups</th>
<th>Group List</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11 Brigade (Syria)</td>
<td>Abdullah Azzam Brigades</td>
<td>14 March Coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades</td>
<td>Abdizhan guerrillas</td>
<td>1920 Revolution Brigades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abu Obaida bin Jarrah Brigade</td>
<td>Abdizhan Separatists</td>
<td>21 May Democratic Alliance (Algeria)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abu Suyay Group (ASG)</td>
<td>Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades</td>
<td>28s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abu Tira (Central Reserve Forces)</td>
<td>Abu Hassan</td>
<td>313 Brigade (Syria)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adan Abyan Islamic Army (AAIA)</td>
<td>Abu Jaafar al-Manuar Brigades</td>
<td>Abdul Qader Huseini Battalions of the Free Palestine movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Mujahiddeen</td>
<td>Abu Musa Group</td>
<td>Abdullah Azzam Brigades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Revolutionary Front</td>
<td>Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)</td>
<td>Abu Chedh Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>Al-Ashar Sham</td>
<td>Abu Obaida bin Jarrah Brigade</td>
<td>Afghani guerrillas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aisha Umm al-Moumenene (Brigades of Aisha)</td>
<td>Achwan al-Mushibani</td>
<td>Afghan separatists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ajnad Misr</td>
<td>Afghan Afghan带有</td>
<td>Afghan Afghani guerrillas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Furqan Brigades</td>
<td>Afghan Afghani guerrillas</td>
<td>Afghan Afghani separatists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Hadid</td>
<td>Afghan Afghani separatists</td>
<td>Afghan Afghani separatists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Jihad</td>
<td>Afghan Afghan带有</td>
<td>Afghan Afghani separatists</td>
</tr>
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<td>Al-Nasrini (India)</td>
<td>Afghan Afghan带有</td>
<td>Afghan Afghani separatists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Unahr</td>
<td>Afghan Afghan带有</td>
<td>Afghan Afghani separatists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Zawhari Loyalists</td>
<td>Afghan Revolutionary Front</td>
<td>Afghan Afghani separatists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Adl Wal Ihsane</td>
<td>Afghan War Veterans</td>
<td>Afghan Afghani separatists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Arifeen</td>
<td>Ahlu-ul-Jannah (Free People of the Galilee)</td>
<td>Afghan Afghani separatists</td>
</tr>
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<td>Al-Faruq Militia</td>
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<td>Algerian Islamic Extremists</td>
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<td>Al-Jihad</td>
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<td>Al-Unahr</td>
<td>Afghan Afghani separatists</td>
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<td>Al-Istiqama al-Pakistani</td>
<td>Al-Unahr</td>
<td>Afghan Afghani separatists</td>
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<tr>
<td>Al-Isah Party</td>
<td>Al-Unahr</td>
<td>Afghan Afghani separatists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Ithihad al-Islami (AIAI)</td>
<td>Al-Ithihad al-Islami (AIAI)</td>
<td>Afghan Afghani separatists</td>
</tr>
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Madhesi Virus Killers
Mafia
Mahan Madhesh Janakanti Party (MMJP) - Nepal
Mahar Feda Tahrik Islamu Afghanistan
Mahaza-e-Inquilab
Mahdiviyat
Mahdi Army
Mahdi
Mahoul Tribe
Mai Mai Bakata Katanga Militia
Mai Mai Simba Militia
Majeten clanmen
Malutia-Pro Govt
Manatari Brotherhood
Manipur Naga People's Army (MNPA)
Manipur Nationalist Revolutionary Party (MNRP)
Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR)
Maoist Communist Center (MCC)
Maoist Communist Party of Manipur
Maoist Fum Laborers Struggle Committee (MXSS)
Maoists
Mausi
Mapuche activists
Mathan Clan
Mariano Moreno National Liberation Commando
Martyr Sami al-Ghul Brigades
Marxists
Massive escape
Matai Abdul
Mateo Morral Insurrectionist Commandos
Mawarai and Mansour Group
May 15
May 98
Mayi Mayi
Mazari Tribesmen
Mazloofe Kisan Sangram Samiti (MKSS)
Merdle Militia
Mesopotamian Army (MEZOR)
Militant Forces Against Huntingdon
Militant Minority (Greece)
Militant Organization of Russian Nationalists
Militant Peasants (NF)
Militant People's Revolutionary Forces
Militants
Military Council of the Tribal Revolutionaries (MCTR)
Militia Members
Minors
Minority Unity Forum
Minutemen American Defense
Miscreants
Miskito Indian Organization
Miszata Brigades
Misseriya Arab Tribesmen
Mitiga Militia
Mlada Bosna
Mob
Modakeke Ethnic Activists
Modakeke Ethnics
Mohajir National Movement
Monbasa Republican Council (MRC)
Mon Guerrillas
Mong Thai Army (MTA)
Mongolian Mukti Morcha
Moro Ghuraba
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MLF)
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)
Moslem Activists
Motherland Party
Mouhadjirouna Brigade
Moussa Ismail sub-clan
Movement for Democracy and Development (MDD)
Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad (MDJT)
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC)
Movement for Dignity and Sovereignty
Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)
Movement for Self-Determination
Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB)
Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND)
Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance
Movement of Niger People for Justice (MNJ)
Movement of the Islamic State (MIE)
Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) (Chile)
Mozambique National Resistance Movement (MNR)
Mujahedeen Army
Mujahedeen Brigades
Mujahedeen Corps in Iraq
Mujahedeen Group
Mujahedeen Shura Council
Mujahedeen Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem
Mujahedeen Kompak
Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK)
Mujahideen Ansar
Mujahideen Islam Pattani
Mujahideen Youth Movement (MYM)
Mujahedin Amoun
Mujahedin Indonesia Timur (MIT)
Mukhtar Army
Mujahidin Daulahah Front
Munadid al-Jumalyi Brigade
Mungiki Sect
Musul Suli Yalahow Militia
Muslim Brotherhood
Muslim Extremists
Muslim Fundamentalists
Muslim Guerrillas
Muslim Militants
Muslim Rebels
Muslim Renewal
Muslim Separatists
Muslim United Army (MUAA)
Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam (MULTA)
Muslim Youth
Muslims
Muslims Against Global Oppression (MAGO)
Mustafa al-Hujairi Group
Mujahideen Mujahideen
Muttahida Qami Movement (MQM)
Muttahida Qarni Movement (MQM)
Naga National Council (NCC)
Naga People
Naga People's Council (NPC)
Naga Students Federation
Namchong-Nyon Students
Narco-Terrorists
National Accord Movement
National Alliance (Chad)
Overall Deniers of Joining the Existing
Pacific Popular Front
Pahadi Cheetah
Pakistan Muslim League (PML)
Pakistani People's Party (PPP)
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
Palestinian Activists
Palestinian Extremists
Palestinian Hezbollah
Pakistani Muslims
Pakistani People's Party (PPP)
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
Palestinian Activists

Paramilitaries
Paramilitary members
Parbatya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samity (PCJSS) - Bangladesh
Pakistani Muslims
Pakistani People's Party (PPP)
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
Palestinian Activists

Peasant protesters
Peasant Self-Defense Group (ACCU)
Peasant Squatters
Pemuda Pancasila
Pentagon Kidnap Group
People Against Gangstertism and Drugs (PAGAD)
People's Alliance
People's Ann Committee
People's Committee against Police Atrocities (PCPA)
People's Democratic Party (PDP)
People's Democratic Struggle Movement
People's Fighter Group (Band of Popular Fighters)
People's Liberation Army (India)
People's Liberation Front (India)
People's Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam
People's Militia of Dagestan
People's Liberation Front of India
People's Movement for the Liberation of the Sahara
People's National Liberation Movement

People's Revolutionary Army (ERP)
People's Revolutionary Army (MRP)
People's Revolutionary Organization
People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK)
People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak-Progressive (PREPAK-P)
People's Revolutionary Organization

People's Tamil Organization
People's United Democratic Movement
People's United Liberation Front (PULF)
People's War Group (PWG)

Pilgrims
Pirates
Political Activists
Political Group
Popular Army for the Restoration of Democracy (APRD)
Popular Army Vanguards- Battalions of Return
Popular Front for Justice in the Congo
Popular Front for Recovery (FPR)
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Gen Cmd (PFLP-GC)
Popular Front for the Liberation of the Sahara
Popular Liberation Army (EPL)
Popular Liberation Front Urban Commando
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
Popular Resistance (Laiki Antistasi)
Popular Resistance Brigade
Popular Resistance Committees
Popular Revolutionary Action
Popular Revolutionary Army (Mexico)
Popular Will (Greece)

Framatome
Powers of the Revolutionary Arc
PravUK-Dalam
Presidential Movement (MP) Militiamen
Pro-Hartal Activists
Pro-Antiade

Professional Killers
Pro-Government Students
Progressive Socialist Party (PSP)
Pro-Indonesia Activists
Pro-Khanda Communists
Proletarian Assaut Group
Proletarian Nukes for Communism
Proletarian Solidarity
Proletarian Self-defense Groups

67
Pro-Palestinian Immigrants
Pro-Russia Militia
Pro-State Militiamen
Protectors of Islam Brigade
Protestant Extremists
Protestants
Provisional RSPCA
Puka Inti Maoist Communist Party
Punjabi Taliban
Purbo Banglar Communist Party
Quri Kanzan Group
Rabbah National Security Force
Rahul Brothers of Giuliani
Raflah al Sahati Brigade
Rahanwein Resistance Army (RRA)
Rally of Democratic Forces (RAFD)
Ramzi Nahra Martyr Organization
Ranbir Sena
Random Anarchists
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh
Raskamboni Movement
Rastas
Rastriya Janashakti Party (RJP)
Raul Ernesto Cruz Leon, Salvadorian
Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA)
Real Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF) - Northern Ireland
Rebel Military Unit
Rebellious Group Lambros Foundas
Rebels
Recompras
Recontras
Red Brigades Fighting Communist Party (BR-PCC)
Red Brigades Fighting Communist Union (BR-UCC)
Red Flag (Venezuela)
Red Hand Commandos
Red Hand Defenders (RHD)
Red Line
Red Sea Afar Democratic Organization (RSADO)
Republic of Texas
Republican Action Against Drugs (RAAD)
Republican Anticlerical Group
Resistance Cell
Resistencia Galega
Resistenza
Resistenza Corsa
Retired Soldier
Revenge Brigade
Revenge of the Trees
Revolved Persons of the Polytech School
Revolutionary Action of Liberation
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
Revolutionary Cells (Argentina)
Revolutionary Cells–Animal Liberation Brigade
Revolutionary Combat Brigades
Revolutionary Continuity
Revolutionary Force
Revolutionary Front
Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN)
Revolutionary Front for Haitian Advancement and Progress (FRAHP)
Revolutionary Headquarters (Turkey)
Revolutionary Insurgent Armed Forces of Ecuador (FAIRE)
Revolutionary Leninist Brigades
Revolutionary Liberation Action (Epanastatiki Apelevtherotiki Drasi) - Greece
Revolutionary Military Council
Revolutionary Nuclei
Revolutionary People's Struggle (ELA)
Revolutionary Perspective
Revolutionary Popular Left
Revolutionary Proletarian Army
Revolutionary Proletarian Initiative Nuclei (NIPR)
Revolutionary Struggle
Revolutionary United Front (RUF)
Revolutionary Violence Units
Revolutionary Voice of the People (VPL)
Revolutionary Workers' Council (Kakurokyo)
Right Sector
Right-Wing Death Squad
Right-Wing Extremists
Right-Wing Group
Right-Wing Gunmen
Right-Wing Militants
Right-Wing Paramilitaries
Right-Wing Youths
rioters
Rival Activists
Rival Afghan Group
Rival Bangladesh Chhatra League Faction
Rival caste
Rival clan
Rival Parts
Rival Party Members
Rival peasant band
Rival Soccer Clubs
Rival Zulu Group, name not stated
Riyadus-Sakhkhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs
Ravon Sadirov Group
Robin Food
Rodolfi Walsh National Command
Rohingya Solidarity Organization
Rote Zoro
Runda Kumpulan Kecil (RKK)
Russian Separatists
Russian Unity
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)
Saa'ad Militia
Sabaot Land Defense Force (SLDF)
Sagrado Corazon Patriotic Group
Saharan Revolutionary Armed Front (FARS)
Saf'ul-Muslimeen
Salafi Abu Bakr al-Salih Army
Salafi Daawa Group
Salafi Extremists
Salafi Jihad
Salafist Group for Preaching and Fighting (GSPC)
Sammillto Sangskritik Jote (Alliance of Cultural Forums)
Samyukta Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha (SJTM)
Samyukta Janata Mukti Morcha (SIMM)
Samyukta Terai Madhes Mukti Party
Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN)
Sandinista Protecor
Sandinistas
Sandray (union) Movement
Sanghita Limbuwan Committee (SLC)
Saraya al-Mukhtar
Sardian Autonomy Movement
Saudi Hizbullah
Save Kashmir Movement
Sayyidah
Scottish National Liberation Army
Secessionists
Secret Organization of al-Qa'ida in Europe
Sect of Revolutionaries (Greece)
Seleka
Self Defense Forces
Separatists
September 11
Serb demonstrators
Serb Radical Party
Serbian Gangsters
Serbs
Secthona People's Rights Movement
Shabelli Valley militia
Shahid Khalsa Force
Shamayya Front
Shan State Army
Shan United Revolutionary Army
Shangyitown residents
Shanu Bahini - Peace Force
Shandy Dwellers
Shield of Islam Brigade
Shiite Muslims
Shining Path (SL)
Shinwari Tribe
Sinhawri Tribe
Shiv Sena
Shop owners
Shira Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries
Sikh Extremists
Simon Bolivar Guerrilla Coordinating Board (COSB)
Sina Province of the Islamic State
Sindhu Liberation Front
Sindhu Desh Liberation Army (SDLA)
Sindhi Muslims
Sipah-e-Sahaba/Pakistan (SSP)
Sipah-I-Mohammee
Sisters in Arms
SJF Detachment
Skinheads
Slum Dwellers
Social Christian Party (PSC)
Socialist Chhatra League
Soldiers of the Caliphate
Solidarity with imprisoned members of Action Directe (AD)
Somali Islamic Front
Somali National Alliance
Sons of the Gesaipe
South Londonderry Volunteers (SLV)
South Ossetian Separatists
South Sudan Democratic Army
South Sudan Liberation Army (SSLA)
Southern Front
Southern Mobility Movement (Yemen)
Southern Sierra Peasant Organization
Southern Yemen Separatists
Sovereign Citizen
Special Purpose Islamic Regiment (SPIR)
Squadrons of Terror (Katibat El Abnaal)
Squatters
St. Kitts Nevis Labor Party
State Council of Indian and Peasant Organization
Strike Enforcers
Strikers
Student Demonstrators
Student Militants
Student Network of Mandalay
Student Radicals
Students
Students U of PNG
Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI)
Sudan Alliance Forces
Sudan Liberation Army-Minni Minawi (SLA-MM)
Sudan Liberation Movement
Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA)
Sudan People's liberation Movement - North
Sudan People's Liberation Movement in Opposition (SPLM-IO)
Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF)
Sudanese People's Front
Sudanese Rebels
Sudurspaschim Janata Dal
Sungu Sungu
Suni Muslims
Suni Supporters
Support of Ocalan-The Hawks of Thrace
Supporters of Ali Abdullah Saleh
Supporters of opposing candidate Abdu Sakatran
Supporters of President J-B Aristide
Supporters of left Gen. Lino Oviedo
Supporters of Second Prime Minister Hun Sen
Supporters of the Islamic State in the Land of the Two Holy Mosques
Supreme Command for Jihad and Liberation
Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI)
Suriname Liberation Front
Swatantra Nepal Dal
Swaziland Youth Congress (Swayoco)
Sword of Islam
Sympathizers of Al-Qaeda Organization
Syrian Army deserters
Syrian Mujahideen
Syrian Social Nationalist Party
Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA)
Tabu Tribe
Talibas (Great Sadness)
Tajamul Ansar al-Islam
Tajik Rebels
Takfir wal-Hijra (Excommunication and Exodus)
Taliban
Taliban (Pakistan)
Tamils
Tamil Liberation Army
Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP)
Tamil Nadu Liberation Army
Tamils
Tanzim al-Islami al-Funjan
Tanzim al-Islami al-Funjan
Tanzim al-Islam
Tanzim al-Islam
Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM)
Tehreek-e-Mujahedin
Tehreek-e-Gulba-Islam
Tehreek-e-Khilafat
Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Aman Balochistan-Jhalawan Brigade (TNAB-Jhalawan Brigade)
Tehreek-e-Taliban Indonesia (TTI)
Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
Telangana Separatists
Terai Army
Terai Cobra
Terai Communist Party
Terai Janatantrik Madhes Party
Terai Janatantrik Party
Terai Madhesi Mukti Morcha (TMMM)
Terai Rastriya Mukti Sena (TRMS)
Terena Indians
Thai Islamic Militants
Tharuhat Joint Struggle Committee (TJSC)
Thavar Caste
The Association for Islamic Mobilisation and Propagation (UAMSHO)
The Black Sun
The Extratables
The Front for the Liberation of the Cabinda Enclave – Renewed (FLEC)
The Husayn Ubayyat Martyrs’ Brigades
The Inevitables
The Irish Volunteers
The Islamic Movement
The Islamic Revolution to Liberate Palestine
The Jean Marc Rouillan Armed and Heartless Columns
The Joint Revolutionary Council
The Justice Department
The Nation’s Army
The New Irish Republican Army
The Northern Alliance (or United Islamic Front for Salvation of Afghanistan – UIFSA)
The Organization for the Return of Legalay
The United Revolutionary Front of Bhutan
The War That Was Never Declared
Tibetan separatists
Ticuna Indian
Tigers
Timorese guerrillas
Timorese Students
Tiv Militia
Togolese Dissidents
Turkmenistan loyalists
Tribal Clash
Tribal Group
Tribal guerrillas
Tribal Separatists
Tribe
Tribe
Trichinopoly Province of the Islamic State
Tripura Separatists
Trinity Priastum Committee (India)
Triung Guerillas
Turegs
Turkic Clan
Tuap Amuru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA)
Turkmenistan Revolutionary Movement
Turkistan Islamic Party
Turkish Communist Party/ Marxist (TKP-ML)
Turkish Hizballah
Turkish Leftists
Turkish Revenge Brigade
Turks of Western Thrace
Tuvalu
U/I Asian Gang
U/I Catholic Traditionals
U/I Islamic Separatists
U/I Liberian Gunmen
U/I Liberians
U/I Militia Group led by Raul Martinez
U/I Private army of tribal politician
U/I Snipers
U/I Somali Militiamen
U/I men
Uganda Democratic Christian Army (UDCA)
Uganda Federal Democratic Alliance (UFEDA)
Uighur Liberation Organization
Uighur Separatists
Uilaj Tribe
Ukrainian Nationalist Group
Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF)
Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF)
Ultra Nationalist Group, name not given
Umar al-Mukhtar Martyr Forces
Umnhane People's Liberation Army (Swaziland)
Umniia Liberation Army
Unarmed Algerian
Unidentified Infiltrators
Unification Army Sons Brigade
Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)
Union members
Union of Chadian Forces (UFNT)
Union of Congolese Patrons (UFC)
Union of Democratic Forces
Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (UFDD)
Union of Peaceful Citizens of Algeria
Union of Revolutionary Communists in Turkey (TKB)
Union Parishad
United A'chik Liberation Army (UALA)
United Action Council
United Baloch Army (UBLA)
United Bengali Liberation Front (UBLF)
United Democratic Liberation Army (UDLA)
United Democratic Terai Liberation Front (UDTLF)
Unified Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship
Unified Front for Democratic Change (FUC)
Unified Front for Nigeria's Liberation (UFNL)
United Janautrik Terai Mukti Morcha (U-JTMM)
United Jihad Council
United Kuki Liberation Army (UKLA)
United Kuki Liberation Front (UKLF) - India
United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA)
United Liberation Front of Barak Valley (ULFBV) - India
United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO)
United National Liberation Front (UNLF)
United National Party
United People's Democratic Front (UPDF) - Bangladesh
United People's Democratic Solidarity (UPDS)
United Popular Action Movement
United Revolutionary Front
United Self Defense Units of Colombia (AUC)
United Students Forum
United Tribal Liberation Army (UTLA)
United Wa State Army
Unknown
Unsubordinated Desires
Urban Guerilla War
Utho Revolutionary Army
Vandaliya Teodoru Suarez
Vanguard of Red Youth (AKM)
Vanguards of the Caliphate
Vanuatu Mobile Force (VMF)
Veterans United for Non-Religious Memorials
Vietnamese
Vietnamese Detainees
Vigorous Burmese Student Warriors
Villagers
Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP)
Viviana Gallardo Command
Volunteers of Innocent People of Nagas (VIPN)
Wahhabi Movement
We Who Built Sweden
West Nile Bank Front (WNBF)
West Side Boys
White Extremists
White Guard
White Legion (Ecuador)
White Legion (Georgia)
White Wolves (UK)
Wild Freedom
Wolves of Islam
Workers/Employees
World Church of the Creator
Yakarria Bango Insurgent Group
Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade
Yekuana
Yemenis
Yimchunger Liberation Front (YLF)
Young Communist League
Young Liberators of Pattani
Young Officer Union of the New Generation and Reformist Armed Forces of the Philippines (YOU-RAFP)
Youth Gang
Youth of Islamic Awakening
Youth of the Land of Egypt
Youths
Zairian Dissidents
Zapatista National Liberation Army
Zehri Youth Force (ZYF)
Zelangrong United Front
Zeum clan
Zero Tolerance
Zetas
Zimbabwe African Nationalist Union (ZANU)
Zintani Militia
Zionist Resistance Fighters
Zomi Revolutionary Army (ZRA)
Zuli Miners
Zuraw al-Imam Rida
Zvadinis
Zwa Tribe